History and Philosophy Seminar

Christopher Cowley, ‘Character and Excuses’

Normally, when we hold someone responsible for something (i.e. we blame them), we presuppose that they were sufficiently free to avoid doing that thing. On the other hand, if their freedom was constrained, then they might offer this as an excuse to deflect the blame. So when my friend is late for a meeting, I’m annoyed; when she does show up, however, she explains that the traffic was bad, and so was not free to get here on time. (And her phone was uncharged.)

A person’s character is a set of dispositions to think, feel and act in certain ways. This sounds like it might constrain that person’s freedom, and if so, then it might serve as an excuse to deflect blame. But this is counter-intuitive: imagine a security guard who claims that he was ‘constrained’ by his character (i.e. his cowardice), and ran away during the bank robbery. Normally we do not hesitate to blame people for their cowardice, or at least for failing to subdue their cowardly impulses. So can my character ever serve as an excuse?

Christopher Cowley is a Canadian philosopher currently working at the Department of Philosophy, Charles University, Prague. He works mainly in ethics and the philosophy of law.